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Emotion in the German Lutheran Baroque and the Development of 
Subjective Time Consciousness 
John Butt 
Heinrich Schütz and J.S. Bach belong to similar cultural and confessional 
environments, but the century that separates them is perhaps one of the most 
significant in the development of what might loosely be defined as modernity. It was 
a period when new theories of the self, consciousness and emotion were mooted, 
many of which still have considerable relevance for our current practices. Does the 
music of Schütz and Bach tell us anything about historical conceptions of emotion 
that goes beyond what we might glean from contemporary writings? Does a 
comparison of these two composers imply similar forms of consciousness or some 
degree of historical change? Considering this music from the standpoint of its effect 
in performance provides an opportunity to pursue a line of enquiry that is rare in 
studies of musical emotion: how can the emotions that are evoked, represented or 
stirred by music function over time, and is the type of durational self that this might 
presuppose – through representation or perhaps through what is assumed of the 
listener - one that is recognisable to us? While there is no shortage of attempts to 
explain the representational aspects of this sort of music through the analysis of 
figures, themes or symbols, much must also lie in the actual sound of performance 
and the friction that voices and instruments bring, particularly in music that is patently 
dialogic. 
 
Already it might be clear that my approach to issues of emotion and affect is primarily 
historical rather than universalist or empirical, but I am also keen to stress that 
historical or cultural particulars might have extremely broad applications, ones that 
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can be assimilated, learned or reworked in locations quite remote from their origins. If 
there is a universal connection between music and emotion, my guess is that this lies 
in the associative powers of music rather than in any specific content that somehow 
survives from one context to another. In other words, music might condition us to 
perceive or experience an emotion that we would not otherwise have had, but the 
actual range of emotions concerned might be surprisingly varied according to 
circumstances. This is a hypothesis similar to one that I have developed in relation to 
music and meaning – its hermeneutic perspective – which proposes that some music 
predisposes us to intuit a sense of ‘meaningfulness’ without necessarily forcing us 
towards any specific meaning.1 Perhaps our intuition and assimilation of meaning and 
emotion in music are somehow connected, equally vague but surprisingly powerful 
once set in motion by the context or associations at hand.2 
 
The associative perspective on emotion certainly has a long history, even if it is 
sometimes obscured by more palpable, mechanistic views of how emotion works, 
those approaches that underwent particular development during the seventeenth 
century. Nevertheless, even Descartes, and particularly Spinoza, stressed that one can 
often feel affection for something that was present when one experienced pleasure on 
a previous occasion – a sort of proto-Proustian association that is entirely contingent 
on the individual’s experiences. In this context, there is no intrinsic affect to be found 
                                                 
1 John Butt, Bach’s Dialogue with Modernity – Perspectives on the Passions 
(Cambridge, 2010), pp. 181-9. 
2 This assumption of a link between emotion and meaning immediately begs 
comparison with Leonard B. Meyer’s Emotion and Meaning in Music (Chicago, 
1956), which does indeed share certain points with my study, such as my skepticism 
of a direct, quasi-linguistic relationship between music and external meanings and 
emotions, and the view that western music is not a natural universal requiring no 
experience to understand. On the other hand, Meyer’s approach is strongly based on 
mid-twentieth century psychology (and particularly on the model of expectation-
deviation) and does not share the broad historical critique that I attempt here. 
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in an object, but its associative powers can be remarkably powerful in the right 
circumstances. As Daniel M. Gross has observed, Aristotle’s definition of emotion in 
his Rhetoric is dependent on contextual, social issues: a king becomes angry because 
he suffers an insult from those he believes are inferior by birth, power and virtue.3 
Presumably, if the same man were to have been born into a different caste, such anger 
would never have arisen. Hume greatly develops this sense of the significance of 
context with his concept of indirect passions (which constitute in effect most of the 
emotions, since they are those experienced in conjunction with other qualities). These 
are encapsulated in his elegant description of the double relation required in the 
experience of pride: while a fine house will not by itself excite pride, if there is an 
object of the emotion (i.e. the self as possessor of the house), the house then becomes 
the cause of the emotion of pride.4  
 
An awareness of the associative conception of emotion brings with it the sense that 
the human subject has at least the potential to influence the course of emotions, by 
changing some aspect of the relationship (to the degree that this is possible). In 
seventeenth century thought Spinoza perhaps comes closest to describing this, with 
his distinction between active and passive emotion.  To him, if the mind has 
inadequate ideas, the passions (externally caused) dominate the self, while adequate 
ideas (internally caused) enable one to be more active. Thus, in contrast to the 
emerging view in the British empiricist tradition, for which emotions are the primary 
building blocks of experience, Spinoza’s passions are, literally, a sign of passivity. 
Positive emotions are those that come from an awareness of one’s active application 
                                                 
3 Daniel M. Gross, The Secret History of Emotion: from Aristotle’s Rhetoric to 
Modern Brain Science (Chicago and London, 2006), pp. 1-3. 
4 David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (1739-40), ed. with an introduction by 
Ernest C. Mossner (Harmondsworth and New York, 1969), pp.  328, 339-41. 
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of adequate ideas (thus the joy of the philosopher as opposed to that of the drunkard). 
In all, then, here there is the sense of a honed self, disciplined into seeking positive 
emotions through thought, something that obviously shares much with a religious 
practice.5  
 
With Hume, writing in the first half of the eighteenth century, there is considerably 
less trust in reason and ideas (adequate or otherwise), but Hume’s description of the 
sort of self-awareness and direction implied by Spinoza comes under the aspect of 
will. Will is what we become conscious of when we knowingly activate a new motion 
of the body or perception of the mind.  While will is clearly an experience (after the 
event, as it were) rather than the act of a sovereign being, Hume allows that emotions 
can be increased or diminished through custom or repetition. Gradually, through 
habituation, the emotion brought by novelty dissipates and is replaced by a new form 
of pleasure associated with moderation, shorn of any painful affections. While this 
same process can work in reverse - pleasure often being converted into pain through 
habit - the overall effect of custom is to increase active habits at the expense of the 
passive.6   
 
Given that religion, particularly in its Protestant forms, also promoted the notion of 
personal change and the iterative honing of the self, it is not surprising that the 
Lutheran tradition also clearly promoted a strong sense of the harnessing of emotions 
for positive effect. Daniel Gross traces this back to Philipp Melanchthon’s educational 
                                                 
5 Baruch Spinoza, Ethics and on the Correction of the Understanding (1677), trans. 
Andrew Boyle with an introduction by T.S. Gregory (London and Melbourne, 1986), 
pp. 84-5, 90, 125 and 148. 
6 Hume, A Treatise on Human Nature, pp. 447, 469-71. 
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programme for the new confession (Elementorum).7 Melanchthon’s neo-Augustinian 
view of human nature as inherently corrupt, because of original sin, meant that art had 
to be employed as a means of moving one away from the original state of nature. 
Rhetoric was to be employed not merely to aid general instruction but specifically to 
redirect the emotions and move the soul in the appropriate way. Thus rhetoric became 
one of the crucial means by which the Reformation engendered an early modern sense 
of the self as malleable and capable of inward change. In another way, Melanchthon’s 
employment of art as a corrective to the natural state, has strong resonances with 
Thomas Hobbes’s famous argument a century later for the necessary artificiality of 
the political commonwealth, into which the conflicting wills and natures of all its 
individuals are subsumed. Hobbes’s ‘nature’ could be thought of as a secular, political 
translation of the doctrine of original sin, now controllable through artificial means 
and coupled with the archetypically modern view that social improvement was 
possible within world history.   
 
While it is difficult to speculate as to how individual musicians might have controlled 
or redirected their own emotions it is interesting to observe some of those passages 
that J.S. Bach underlined in his copy of Abraham Calov’s bible commentary (largely 
an anthology of writings by Luther himself). One telling annotation comes at the point 
that Luther tells us that God will punish us if we use our possessions and gifts badly, 
so we are therefore allowed – indeed exhorted - to express anger for the sake of our 
office (something that is assumed to be God-given).8 Never should one show anger on 
                                                 
7 Daniel M. Gross, ‘Melanchthon’s rhetoric and the practical origins of Reformation 
human science’, History of the Human Sciences 13/3 (2000), 5-22. 
 
8 Howard H. Cox (ed.), The Calov Bible of J.S. Bach (Ann Arbor, 1985), facsimile 
218, p. 445. 
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one’s own account ‘no matter how severe the offence has been’, but even small 
slights to one’s office are worthy of rebuke. Bach surely experienced a whole range of 
emotions throughout his life, but perhaps passages like this suggest that he would 
have worked particularly hard at channeling his emotional impulses towards whatever 
was useful in supporting what he believed to be his God-given status as musician and 
director of music. 
 
Music might well have performed an important emotional role at a time when it was 
increasingly believed that one’s emotional well-being could be cultivated from the 
inside. Indeed, the Lutheran context gave this role a specific focus – the ‘appropriate 
moving of the affections’ is virtually a commonplace in Lutheran writings from the 
post-Reformation era, well into the eighteenth century (although, I should stress, any 
consistent or deeply insightful ‘theory of the affects’ remains elusive).  One of the 
most telling commentaries on music from the Lutheran perspective comes from 
Bach’s contemporary Gottfried Ephraim Scheibel (1721), for whom the rich 
emotional range associated with opera and operatic music could profitably be 
transferred to church practice. Adopting a rather mechanistic approach to the affects, 
Scheibel suggests that one’s basic affection in relation to any particular kind or piece 
of music is essentially consistent, and thus transferable; all that changes in moving 
this music from theatre to church is the object, the emotion adhering just as easily to a 
sacred text as it did to the secular one.9 This might remind us of Descartes’ gundog, 
trained to modify its impulse to run away when the gun fires by running towards the 
                                                 
9 Gottfried Ephraim Scheibel, ‘Random Thoughts about Church Music in our Day’ 
(1721), introduced and translated by Joyce Irwin, in Bach’s Changing World: Voices 
in the Community, ed. Carol K. Baron (Rochester, NY, 2006), pp. 227-49. 
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partridge.10 Joyce Irwin suggests that Scheibel’s attitude is a departure from the 
orthodox Lutheran tradition, where the spiritual force of words from Scripture are 
meant to have a specific effect which the emotions follow, rather than vice versa.11 
But the emphasis on association, at the level of the object of the affect, is at least 
consonant with the tradition of turning the affects to good use. It would be interesting 
to consider whether Schütz and Bach might have differed in their view of emotion, 
mirroring a gradual historical change from a belief in ‘correct’ emotion emanating 
from Scripture, towards the emancipation of emotions into a free-standing realm, 
which only then can be co-opted for spiritual purposes. If there is indeed a change of 
emphasis, it must still be remembered that the free-standing view of the emotions had 
always been latent in the Lutheran tradition. While Scheibel’s justification for using 
the most modern of secular musical styles in the sacred context was incendiary in the 
light of the contemporary debates (that had their roots in the Pietist antipathy towards 
complex music), there was a long tradition in adapting secular melodies for sacred 
use. 
 
Co-opting the secular for sacred purposes is common to both Lutheran and Counter-
Reformation traditions. One striking theme that long predates the Reformation is the 
relation between earthly love - profoundly emotional and patently erotic - and the 
spiritual necessity to feel love for, and from, the divine. The Song of Songs, which 
provides the text for Schütz’s magnificent duet setting of ‘O quam tu pulchra es’ and 
‘Veni de libano’ (Symphoniae sacrae I, 1629), also influences many of Bach’s texts 
                                                 
10 René Descartes, The Passions of the Soul (1649), translated by John Cottingham, 
Robert Stoothoff and Dugald Murdoch, in The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, 
vol. 1 (Cambridge, 1985), p. 348. 
11 Joyce Irwin, ‘Bach in the Midst of Religious Transition’, in Bach’s Changing 
World, pp. 108-126, esp. pp. 116-17. 
 8 
that concern the relation of the believer to Jesus (such as Cantata 140, ‘Wachet auf’ 
and Picander’s libretto for the Matthew Passion). Cantata 32, ‘Liebster Jesu’ belongs 
very much to the same world, although it doesn’t quote the Song directly. These are 
the two pieces to which this study is directed 
 
Although the Song of Songs has often been used more or less literally as celebrating 
the joys of human love within a spiritually permissible context, it has frequently been 
interpreted in a more allegorical fashion. In the Jewish tradition it would be seen 
representing the love between God and the children of Israel, as his bride. This then 
became associated with the love of Jesus for his Church from the early years of the 
Christian tradition (the bride-bridegroom relationship already being well established 
in latter books of the New Testament). These traditions already suggest an early sense 
of the transferability of emotion, the redirection of an urge for spiritual purposes. 
They also imply a flexibility of gender that might perhaps be surprising to those 
unfamiliar with the history of Christian practice: the human subject is in the feminine 
position whether relating to Jesus on the individual level or as part of the church. 
Given the ‘song’ epithet for this poem, there is perhaps a sense in which music had 
long had an association with the fluidity of this sort of process. 
 
Schütz may well have known Monteverdi’s famous 1610 setting of a closely related 
text from the same poem, ‘Pulchra es’, which is also a duet (for high voices), with 
alternations of duple and triple times. In the context of Marian devotion, an extra 
layer is added to the sense of this text, by which the object of adoration becomes 
Mary, who is also associated with Jerusalem (and thus again with the Church itself). 
Two things are immediately obvious from Monteverdi’s setting: the composer, in his 
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seconda prattica mode, typically makes the words ‘the mistress of the harmony’, the 
two together thus setting out to fulfil the Platonist imperative to follow and enhance 
the disposition of the soul. Secondly, we as listeners are surely moved though the 
sympathy we feel for the emotions undergone by the characters of the singers, exactly 
as would happen in secular monody or opera. We witness the object of their desire 
and awe through the sound of their voices and thus assimilate their subject position. 
Perhaps one of the greatest (re)discoveries of the seconda prattica era was that an 
emotional gesture in performance can create an analogous feeling in the listener; this 
is similar to what modern neurobiological studies outline with the concept of ‘mirror 
neurons’: animals are observed to undergo the same mental processes as those of their 
fellows engaged in specific activities.12 
 
What was a performance of Schütz’s ‘O quam tu pulchra es’, written about two 
decades later, meant to achieve? It is difficult and surely wrong to assume precise 
purposes, but it presumably had the unimpeachable Lutheran aim of presenting a 
biblical text clearly and giving the listener the opportunity to recall it, meditating on 
its meaning and broader implications. Just as in the Monteverdi, the voice of the 
‘male’ lover is split into two, but it is also frequently mimicked and reinforced by the 
wordless, but surprisingly eloquent, lines for violins. But without Monteverdi’s 
Marian context, the most likely allegorical interpretation would be to consider the 
male voice of the Song of Songs as that of Jesus addressing the church or the 
individual believer as lover. While splitting the voice of the godhead into multiple 
voices was something that Schütz did elsewhere (most memorably in the motet 
textures of ‘Saul, Saul, was verfolgst du mich?’) what is striking here is that it is the 
                                                 
12 See Barbara Maria Stafford, Echo Objects – The Cognitive Work of Images 
(Chicago and London, 2007), pp. 75-104, esp. p. 77. 
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listener who is the potential object of adoration. A Christian might thus be 
predisposed to be appropriately ‘seduced’ by this music, the duetting of the voices 
already demonstrating a sense of intimate partnership, doubling that between 
performers and listener, and the imitation from the violins perhaps providing a sort of 
‘blank’ that the listener is enjoined to fill. There is the possibility, then, that the 
listener fills a different subject position from that implied by Monteverdi’s setting and 
the concerns of the early seconda prattica.  
 
As Bettina Varwig has recently shown, it is entirely appropriate to relate Schütz’s 
activity as a composer to rhetoric, but traditional scholarship has been too narrow in 
its concentration on the individual, localized, figures and their possible meanings. By 
acknowledging the rhetorical tradition stemming from Erasmus, Varwig suggests a 
much broader and more powerful conception by which the meaning of a text is 
amplified through repetition, rearrangement and formal patterning.13 In this way, 
Schütz’s music is far more interesting and subtle in its structure than analysts have 
commonly believed. Indeed, the form of each piece is uniquely derived from the way 
the composer develops the implications and shape of the text and it is thus unlikely to 
be appreciated if formal conventions are assumed in advance. Moreover, the music 
achieves at least some of its effect through its own self-sufficiency; if it were entirely 
subservient to the text it would surely become dispensable to some extent (not that 
one could ever consider Monteverdi’s music dispensable). Its components are 
developed, expanded and connected in a manner parallel to the way a rhetorician 
might work with a verbal text - the suggestion of development is far more potent than 
the outlining of precise semantic components. Most productive of all in Varwig’s 
                                                 
13 Bettina Varwig, “Mutato semper habitu”: Heinrich Schütz and the Culture of 
Rhetoric’, Music and Letters 90/2 (2009), 215-239. 
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Erasmian approach is her consideration of the memory and expectations of the 
listener, something that seems of a piece with the way the composer has presented and 
‘unwrapped’ the material. The reception of the audience is, after all, the goal of all 
rhetorical procedures and, we might assume, a composer well versed in this sort of 
process was building directly on his own experiences as a listener. 
 
Building on my earlier observations on the role of emotions in rhetoric, might it be 
that the sort of amplification that musical rhetoric really achieves relates more to the 
feelings surrounding the text - and whatever theological context accompanies it - than 
to the actual meanings it might evoke? Perhaps any meaning we intuit in music, 
spiritual or otherwise, is secondary to this emotional substrate. But either way, if the 
music has the potential to evoke feelings – or more precisely – to help put one in the 
state of mind to feel feelings, it must somehow relate to the way our consciousness 
can work in time. This is the area that is least covered in historical discussions of 
music, so actual pieces of music might provide a particularly valuable area of 
evidence. 
 
Absolutely central to the study of pre-modern subjective time is St Augustine’s 
meditation on time in his Confessions.14 Augustine was puzzled by the way his 
conscious identity seemed to persist if the present is clearly without duration, the past 
irretrievable and the future unknown. His solution was to suggest that past, present 
and future cohere within the mind, as the present of past things (memory), the present 
of present things (direct perception) and the present of future things (expectations). 
He used the example of reciting a psalm (something that immediately conjures up the 
                                                 
14 St Augustine, The Confessions, trans. R.S. Pine-Coffin (Chicago, 1990), pp. 119-
25. 
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potential for musical performance) by which the expected future steadily passes into 
the past as the point of reading moves forwards. He overcame the problem of the 
pinpoint subjectivity of the present (i.e. the fact that our consciousness at any 
particular moment is gone as soon as it comes) by noting the persistence of the mind’s 
attention and how it is through this that what is expected passes into the memory. 
Before beginning a psalm, his faculty of expectation engages the whole, but, as he 
begins to recite, this future expectation pours through the consciousness into the 
memory (perhaps rather like the sand in an egg-timer). Augustine had the intention 
that this exercise in distending the soul through broadening the individual moment, 
with its expectations and retentions, could enable us to direct ourselves towards 
eternity; but there is surely the potential for development in the secular realm too, by 
which one’s sense of being can become deeper, more thoroughly grounded in worldly 
time. This is precisely one of the aims of those who later developed the sense of a self 
as no longer simply embedded in a given order but potentially able to develop, 
perhaps in unpredictable ways, during one’s lifespan. The Reformation certainly 
played a part in this early modern development, but so surely did changes in listening 
to - and thus composing and performing - music. 
 
Andrew Bowie suggests that a new emphasis on the role of music in delineating the 
time and subjectivity of the listener might be evident in Descartes’ early treatise 
Compendium Musicae (1618), where the philosopher suggests that hearing the end of 
a song reminds us of its beginning and of what happened in between.15 While this 
does not represent much more than an adaptation of the Augustinian view specifically 
                                                 
15 Andrew Bowie, Music, Philosophy, and Modernity (Cambridge University Press, 
2007), p. 52. 
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to music, it may well be that the increasing autonomous structuring of music in the 
seventeenth century betrays an acute conception of the development of individual 
consciousness in time, something sustained and reinforced through the emotional 
associations that could be prolonged in musical time. Certainly, in his last treatise, 
Descartes sees the benefit of passions as lying in the fact that they can help to prolong 
those thoughts that it is good for the soul to preserve and which might otherwise have 
been erased.16  Hume suggests something tantalizingly close to a musical connection 
when he relates the human mind and its passions to a stringed instrument, on which 
vibrations remain after the stroke has ceased, gradually and insensibly decaying. Thus 
when something provokes a succession of emotions, each will somehow be mixed 
with the others, the overall emotion sometimes being determined by those that 
predominate or perhaps by some sort of amalgam of the two.17   
 
Nevertheless, there is little in the German Lutheran environment to suggest much of 
an intellectual development of subjective time consciousness. The entry on ‘Zeit’ in 
Zedler’s Lexicon presents time as essentially cosmological, marked by the movement 
of stars, which is then simply further divided into the standard human measurements 
of time; one thing simply and regularly succeeds another.18 This mechanistic attitude 
tends to reaffirm the traditional, essentially cyclical, view of time, which the human 
enters and leaves as if joining and alighting from a carousel. The nature of our 
understanding is such that we can peg the cumulative duration of our inner Nun to the 
regular and measurable progress of outer, cosmological time. Each moment that 
                                                 
16 Descartes, The Passions of the Soul, p. 354. 
17 Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, pp. 487-8. 
18 Johann Heinrich Zedler (ed.), Grosses vollständiges Universal-Lexicon aller 
Wissenschaften und Künste, 64 vols. (Halle and Leipzig, 1732-50), vol. 61, columns 
725-858. 
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passes is a shortening of what remains of our duration, leading to the moralising 
conclusion that one should use the time at one’s disposal well, following God’s will 
and practising due diligence. 
  
One can imagine many ways in which music might traditionally have supported 
Augustine’s conception of time, accompanying the expected verses of a psalm with a 
recurring tone that has its own syntactical expectations parallel to the form of the 
individual verses. The Lutheran chorale tradition would have had a similar role for 
music, a repeated, recognizable musical form that brings its own protentions and 
retentions, working in parallel to the expected text, but in a faster ‘gearing’ as it were. 
Turning to Schütz’s Song of Songs setting, one might imagine a biblically competent 
listener anticipating the successive verses abstracted from the poem, that cumulatively 
describe in near preposterous terms the attributes of the beloved – the eyes like a 
dove, the hair like goats, the teeth like freshly washed ewes, right up to the breasts as 
two young roes. Schütz obligingly employs a sort of chant for these sections, a regular 
recitation in the modern Italian style that, at least in its first appearances, generates a 
sense of regularity.  
 
But what makes Schütz’s setting so compelling lies in the ways he modifies this basic 
process of expectation and memory. It is surely here that the emotional element might 
come into play since, instead of a steady flow of music-supported text, the music 
forces us to remain with different parts of the text in different ways. We might 
thereby learn that there is more than one way by which we can persist in time, 
however much our pinpoint of consciousness might proceed with uncontrollable 
regularity; certain sensations might well last longer than others. In typically rhetorical 
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fashion, the piece begins with a basic topic that is immediately enforced through 
amplification; the text begins with the essential flattering statement ‘O how fair thou 
art’, set with the suitably expressive interval of the diminished forth, and this 
statement is itself embellished with the sequential, cumulative music for ‘my love, my 
dove, my lovely, my immaculate one’.  
Example 1 
This complex is presented three times, first as a solo, then as a duet and finally for the 
violins alone. Repetition, embellishment, amplification and suitable musical figures 
are all standard fare with Schütz and his Italianate contemporaries. But what is 
particularly interesting here is the way the opening, flattering statement is lengthened: 
the bass’s first four bar entry is lengthened by one bar on its second appearance (b. 
15), and the tenor immediately inaugurates a duet version which is also five bars long 
(19-23); when the violins copy this (from b. 33) this section is six bars long.  
Examples 2-3 
Interestingly the intervening sequential sections (‘my love, my dove’ etc.) are always 
the same length. If we were to think of this as a form of consciousness-stretching, 
Schütz seems to be accustoming us to a relatively short presentation of the idea, 
emotion or sense for ‘O how fair thou art’ and then stretches this into progressively 
longer durations. By separating these lengthening spans with the sequential list of 
loving epithets he is exercising this discipline in a way that capitalizes on our lack of 
a continuous consciousness. On returning to the key phrase we perhaps realize that 
the trace of the sensation it evoked is still with us, and not a memory that is ‘restaged’ 
(like, for instance, our memory of the opening of Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony, 
recalled right at this very moment of reading).  
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I am already adopting here the language of a much later theory of time consciousness, 
that of the phenomenologist Edmund Husserl,19 but my claim here is that Schütz is 
developing something of this sort of conception in the early modern context of the 
seventeenth century.20 For Husserl, retentions stream out behind one rather like a 
comet’s tail, but rather than being a continuous form of consciousness, the retentions 
overlap with one another in a sort of tiling effect. Thus the expanding of the ‘O quam 
tu pulchra es’ sensation is partly contingent on its being interleaved with something 
else (otherwise, at least according to this way of conceiving time consciousness, it 
would be unmanageable). The returns teach us that the ‘O quam tu pulchra es’ has not 
entirely faded from our consciousness, and each lengthening repetition extends the 
period during which we are directly conscious of it. As the piece proceeds with its 
sections in duple time, adding more pictorial details to the lover’s view of the 
beloved, the triple-time ‘O quam tu pulchra’ returns, now in regular five-bar cells, as 
if only a regular reminder is now needed.   
 
Obviously, emotion is one indissoluble component of a broader complex of 
consciousness but there is the specific sense that whatever emotion might be conjured 
up by the text - its flattering implications, its theological resonances and the 
expressive musical intervals, together with the way they grate across the singer’s 
voice - is seeded and successively regenerated and prolonged. This is little short of a 
musical seduction, by which a lover repeats a flattering exclamation interspersed with 
similes that on their own might seem preposterous. If successful, our reciprocal 
                                                 
19 Edmund Husserl, On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time 
(Zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins, 1893-1917), trans. John Barnett 
Brough (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1991). 
20 Something of a precedent is hinted at in Hume’s approach to human consciousness, 
as I suggest above (note 15), the British empirical tradition providing a major 
precedent for Husserl’s phenomenology. 
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feelings sink in over time, as if even love must follow rhetorical principles. Following 
Hume, we might develop the ‘correct’ emotion (say a sense of loving) only once we 
recognize ourselves as the object of the emotion (and, to complete the religious 
circuit, Jesus or the Godhead as its cause). The intervening texts (all but the last 
taking up similar spans around five bars) display the sorts of word-painting that is so 
often associated with Schütz, but, I would suggest, the crucial function of these is to 
provide a foil for the seductive refrain, as if the return to this is being both ‘tested’ 
and coloured by the pictorial imagery.  
 
Whatever the interplay of the two types of metre and their associated poetry, the piece 
takes on a dualistic nature that is also underlined by the fact that the violins usually 
only play in the triple time ‘O quam tu pulchra’ sections. Such dualism is of course of 
a piece with a type of subjectivity that arose specifically in the seventeenth century, 
which sees the beginnings of a definition of the subject as being contingent on the 
object. It is certainly not implausible that one could hear the triple sections as relating 
to the listener’s iterative subjectivity (itself the object of the amorous, if divine 
speaker), the duple ones as a more objective pictorialization, which the listener can 
take or leave. However, the final duple section, over twice the length of the previous 
ones, is striking in that only here do the violins participate, in dialogue with the text 
(‘Thy two breasts are like two young roes, roes that are twins’). The object thus 
becomes doubled, by which the violins seem to depict what the singers suggest; of all 
the images so far depicted this is the one that participates in the duality that informs 
the piece on so many levels (e.g. the pairing of speaker and listener, the pairing of the 
singers, of the singers with violins, of metres, of levels of consciousness). It is 
perhaps this sense of culmination that means that the closing ‘O quam tu pulchra es’ 
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is quite different from the previous ones. The original violin presentation of the 
opening, extended to six bars at the outset is now preceded by a new two-bar tag, 
which is extended yet further when the voices have it, and all this is reworked in the 
final bars of the piece. While this certainly reminds us of the opening there is surely 
the feeling that things have changed, that the insistent rhetorical pacing of the piece 
has resulted in a new state of affairs (most obviously transformational is perhaps the 
violins’ reintegration of the diminished fourth into an upward arpeggio, creating an 
augmented triad, bb. 130-1).  
Example 4 
The type of consciousness implied by Schütz’s setting is not unlike that intuited 
Augustine, by which the music tends to follow the progress of the text in a time frame 
similar to that of reading. Yet the insistent repetitions of the opening line and its 
cumulative effect also suggest a thickening of one particular aspect of the text, as if a 
single moment of consciousness is developed in concentric circles, interleaved with 
the expected linear progress of the text. The listener seemed encouraged to prolong 
the ‘useful’ emotion conjured up by the seductive refrain. Music thus helps to 
‘strengthen and prolong thoughts in the soul which it is good for the soul to preserve 
and which otherwise might easily be erased from it’, as Descartes said of emotion in 
general.21  
 
Turning to Bach, particularly in the type of music most distant from Schütz’s, namely 
his highly developed aria forms, it is this cyclic and iterative form of consciousness 
that is emphasized at the expense of the moment-to-moment progress of recitation. 
What was a small flexible unit for the title line of  Schütz’s ‘O quam tu pulchra es’ 
                                                 
21 See note 16, above. 
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often becomes a much larger ritornello, a piece of music that is usually syntactically 
complete in its own right. If we listen to the opening instrumental section of ‘Liebster 
Jesu, mein Verlangen’ we are in no doubt that the music evokes a particular mood or 
emotion, one that is perhaps more intense in its immediate presentation than what we 
hear in the music of Schütz’s generation. The basic figurations and accompanimental 
devices are more static and regular than the repetitive elements in Schütz, but they are 
thereby more saturated. The oboe melody, at least, follows familiar rhetorical 
principles of repetition, elaboration and intensification. One thing that is especially 
striking is the fact that while this 8-bar stretch is clearly all of a piece, all one affect 
(something which is virtually a cliché in descriptions of Baroque music), it also 
conveys a sense of direction and almost has its own form of narrative. We are perhaps 
encouraged to assimilate one specific mood over a period of time (seemingly longer 
than the seventeenth century subject of Schütz’s music) but also to witness its 
progress and development, in a way analogous to how our own feelings emerge and 
develop over a span of time. With Bach’s cyclic but often unpredictable structures 
music seems to have taken over something of the atmosphere of religious ritual, but 
coupled with the immediacy and emotional intensity of personal experience. In this 
respect it could almost be considered an idealization of how Lutheran worship was 
meant to work in practice. 
Example 5 
If it’s clear that the music both evokes and tracks a sort of subjectivity that is close to 
what we might call a ‘modern’ kind here – one sustained by the consciousness of 
oneself enduring over longer stretches of time - it is surely also the case that we so far 
have no specific idea as to what the emotion actually is, or what this music is about. 
We might hazard a guess that it could relate to longing, love, perhaps loss and sadness 
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too; and it is certainly a deeper emotion than the norm, both the musical structure and 
its sonority are likely to ‘hook’ us (emotional intervals, a vocalizing oboe - the list is 
potentially endless). But whichever it is could depend on a very broad range of 
contextual issues, relating both to the environment in which we hear this and to our 
own presuppositions. Indeed, the suspicions that some scholars have had that this 
piece might have started out as part of a different cantata, perhaps a secular 
congratulatory one from the Cöthen era, immediately reminds us that this music is 
indeed extremely adaptable.  Scheibel’s belief in the transferability of emotion, in his 
case from opera to church, is thus amply substantiated.  
 
In the event, the range of possible emotions – say from love to sadness – fits the 
eventual text perfectly: in Christian terms we now hear the partner of the speaker we 
heard in ‘O quam tu pulchra es’ – the soul of the individual believer expressing 
intense love for ‘Beloved Jesus’; yet there is also the idea that Jesus has somehow 
been lost and is no longer sensed close by. Reading the Gospel for the day (Luke 2: 
41-52), this notion of loss becomes even clearer, since this relates the story of the 
twelve-year-old Jesus eluding his parents and eventually being found in the Temple, 
‘my father’s house’ (Jesus’s voice refers to this in the succeeding recitative). So the 
feeling of panicked loss is turned into the loss the believer feels whenever she 
believes her spiritual partner to be absent.  
 
The aria as a whole plays out something of the dynamic that is seeded in the 
ritornello: a sense of consistent movement and affect but with a degree of 
intensification in the vocal part towards the end (particularly for the line, ‘my refuge, 
give me joy’). This aria is more bound to its ritornello than even the norm with Bach, 
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with the majority of the bars being a direct transposition: after the two-bar ‘motto’ 
opening, we have the first five bars of E minor, then a complete ritornello in B minor, 
the first five bars again in F-sharp minor, a complete ritornello in A minor, three bars 
transition, and finally a complete ritornello in E minor. In other words, the ritornello 
and the sort of trajectory it implies is almost always there, as if the hidden pattern that 
the singer seems to lose and - after the ecstatic coloratura on the words ‘erfreue mich’ 
- to find again for the final complete reiteration. Melodically she is constantly 
intertwining with the oboe part, in a sensual dialogue with a wordless partner that to 
the Christian might say even more than the text can possibly express alone. To us as 
listeners – even if we are not immediately aware of the repetitions and transpositions 
of the ritornello – there is perhaps a sense of the constant unfolding of something we 
knew or felt already, an increasing uncanniness. We might feel invited to identify 
with the singer, losing and finding the instruments, or even to feel ourselves as a 
further part of the counterpoint. Our retentions of the past are regenerated and 
deepened, but rendered continuous through the polyphonic aspects of the experience. 
If much of the mechanism here is similar to that employed by Schütz, Bach’s 
achievement seems to be something closer to the more modern sort of subjectivity 
that is deepened through its very sense of alienation; one’s self is intensified through 
the acknowledgement of its possible effacement. The simultaneous finding and losing 
of Jesus implied by the text seems to be paralleled in the very music, by which the 
voice successively finds, loses and finds again the oboe line, a line which itself seems 
to evoke incomparable beauty and joy simultaneously with loss and despair.  
 
Have I been able to identify anything specific about emotion in the context of German 
Lutheran music? Almost certainly not, since my approach has been to suggest that the 
 22 
insight this music provides is that musical emotion is primarily associative rather than 
something that can be picked out and held up with a triumphal ‘here it is!’. I suggest 
that this music is of a piece with historically conditioned forms of sustained 
consciousness and that emotions can play a significant part in the way the increasing 
stretches of time are filled. Both composers write music that is patently formulaic and 
‘second hand’ in terms of its basic materials, but Schütz’s pieces are put together in a 
way that is entirely particular to its text and the way this interacts with the musical 
development. Bach’s are equally particular although here the independent musical 
development is much more detachable from the text. But it is this very detachability 
that makes its association with the text and theological context so potent. This idea of 
autonomous musical development actually increasing the potential scope of the music 
in serving its original purpose seems to me a specifically modern aspect of Bach’s 
achievement. It parallels some of the ways modern subjects develop in time with a 
sense of increasing autonomy, a sort of autonomy that permits a broad range of 
applications and directions beyond any received context. The idea of stirring up an 
emotion, sustaining and developing it, and turning it to a specific purpose, is 
absolutely central to thought on the development of the subject in early modernity, to 
the honing of will (whether in the name of ‘correct’ orthodox religion or for utterly 
worldly purposes). But perhaps it is music that gives us the most palpable picture of 
how this might have been applied in practice.  
